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ABSTRACT 
Studies of human decision making have demonstrated that stress exacerbates risk taking. Since 
all decisions involve some element of risk, stress has critical impact on decision quality. 
Decisions are found to improve with stress up to an optimal threshold beyond which 
deterioration is observed. However, few studies have examined the psychological experiences 
underlying risk-taking behavior in conjunction with stress creators. In this paper we propose a 
research framework that integrates pre-conditions of stress (perceptions of high gain/loss, risk, 
complexity, and organizational pressure) with observed psychological experiences (time 
pressure, uncertainty, information overload, and dynamism) that potentially result in risky 
decision making. This framework suggests that decision support systems have the potential of 
mitigating or enhancing the psychological perceptions of stress and, hence, impacting decision 
quality. Empirical testing of a component of this framework provided interesting preliminary 
results. Subjects experiencing high stress indicated the same levels of perceived uncertainty and 
dynamism as subjects exposed to low stress, suggesting that use of a decision support system 
mitigated the perceptions of dynamism and uncertainty for the high stress group. Contrary to 
hypotheses, the use of a decision support system did not mitigate perceptions of information 
overload.  
  
Keywords: decision making under stress, decision support system, information overload, time 
pressure, decision quality, stress, Yerkes Dodson Law 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 Cognitive science has recognized that “psychological stress exceeding a certain intensity 
affects the quality of decision making” (Keinan, 1987).  Proposed aids to decision making under 
stress (DMUS) have varied with significant emphasis being placed on use of decision support 
systems (DSS) (Smith, Arnold and Sutton, 1997; Smith, Johnston and Paris, 2004; Sarter and 
Schroeder, 2001). Although studies have been completed in specific domain areas, the rich and 
varied theoretical viewpoints emerging from psychology, information systems, and 
organizational behavior have led to mixed results. Many of these studies concluded that decision 
making under extremely stressful conditions such as emergency response can only be studied 
within the specific application domain of interest (Hutchins, 1996) relying on previous training 
(Klein, 1989; Kowalski-Trakofler, Vaught and Scharf, 2003) and preparatory information 
(Inzana et al., 1996).  Researchers argued that decision aiding in such situations had to be 
tailored to the specific decision and user group (Klein et al., 1993).  Under the more normal 
conditions encountered in business and managerial situations, decision making has been studied 
more generally in terms of stressors such as time pressure and information overload (Smith, 
Arnold and Sutton, 1997; Maule, Hockey and Bdzola, 2000; Marsden, Pakath and Wibowo, 
2002; Aminilari and Pakath, 2005).  Studies have shown that DSS can assist the user in these 
situations and improve decision quality.  Although some researchers have suggested that “the 
value of a computer-based decision aid may be most apparent under higher stress conditions” 
(Grabowski and Sanborn, 2001, p.114), few have conducted an in-depth assessment of decision 
quality and specific psychological experiences using a DSS under stressful compared to low 
stress conditions.   
In this paper we propose an integrative framework for DMUS that associates pre-
conditions of stress (perceptions of high gain/loss, risk, complexity, and organizational pressure) 
with psychological experiences (time pressure, uncertainty, information overload, and 
dynamism) that result in potentially risky decisions. The framework relies on the vast body of 
prior empirical literature to suggest a mitigative role for DSS on psychological perceptions of 
stress and, thereby, decision performance.  We conduct an exploratory investigation of this 
model with a group of 89 decision makers.   
The next section provides an overview of the literature associated with decision making 
under stress and examines preconditions and manifestation of stress in decision making. An 
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integrating model based on the literature is proposed in Section 3.0 to explain the mitigating 
effect of DSS.  The experimental study is then described in Section 4.0, and data are presented 
together with analyses.  Results are discussed in Section 5.0, and the paper concludes with a 
summary and contributions to the literature. 
    
2.0 BACKGROUND 
2.1 Stress and Decision Making 
Cognitive resource theory (Vecchio, 1990) confirms that stress can negatively impact 
intelligence and decision quality. Harassed decision-makers often make riskier decisions (Lehner 
et al., 1997). Baradell and Klein (1993) reported that stress, perceived as time pressure, low self-
esteem, and threats of punishment for poor performance, resulted in more errors on cognitive 
tasks, use of stereotypes when making judgments, and a greater tendency to ignore situational 
norms in reaching decisions.  In group settings, Smith, Arnott, and Sutton (1997) found that the 
quality of group decisions declines under conditions of stress. Stressed decision makers usually 
demonstrate impaired performance (Ahituv, Igbaria and Sella, 1998) and generate fewer 
alternatives in the decision process because these alternatives appear less attractive under 
conditions of stress (Mann and Tan, 1993; Svenson, Edland and Karlsson, 1985). In sum, 
numerous studies have confirmed deleterious effect of stress on decision quality. 
Diverse explanations have been proposed for demonstration of deleterious behavior under 
stress. Decision makers seek rational solutions which may not be accessible under the 
circumstances (Fiedler, 1986). They ignore crucial information, use simplifying and often 
inefficient strategies (Lehner et al., 1997; Svenson and Edland, 1987), and become extremely 
alert to discrediting evidence (Wright, 1974). Janis (1993) proposed decision conflict theory as a 
coping behavior that decision makers use to respond to stress by becoming hyper vigilant in their 
search for information.  In this state they frantically search for a solution, fail to consider all 
alternatives, process information in a disorganized manner, and rapidly shift among possible 
solutions. Furthermore, stress can interfere with a fair evaluation of appropriateness of responses 
(Baumann, Sniezek and Buerkle, 2001). Typifying recency and availability bias ( Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974), under stressful conditions decision makers can revert to familiar responses 
from prior experiences which may be inadequate for the challenging situation at hand (Kaemph 
et al., 1996).Since rationality is bound by ability of the human mind to process complex 
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information (Simon, 1997), demands of stressful conditions are often beyond the capabilities of 
human short term memory (Smith, Johnston and Paris, 2004). Physiological explanations (de 
Quervain et al. 2000) suggest that stress can cause the release of steroids that can interfere with 
short term memory. Under such circumstances, decisions are more likely to be faulty than 
decisions resulting from rational, organized decision making.   
Much research effort in DMUS has focused on decision making under extreme 
emergency situations as those experienced by emergency personnel. Such studies exist in the 
area of emergency management (Kowalski, 1995), air and military warfare (Morrison et al., 
1997; Angelborg-Thanderz, 1997; Hutchins, 1996), commercial aviation (Poulton, 1976), and 
nuclear emergencies (Papamichail and French, 2005). Managerial DMUS has focused largely on 
the impact of stress induced by time pressure with significant focus in the auditing and 
accounting areas (Smith et al., 1997; Arnold et al., 1998; Sutton et al., 1998; Arnold et al., 
2000).  Our work falls within this domain of management decision making. 
 
2.2 Pre-conditions to and Psychological Manifestation of Stress  
What causes stress i.e. what are its pre-conditions? While much has been written in the 
context of job and organizational stress, for purposes of this paper, we examine stress as 
experienced in individual decision settings, with the acknowledgement that general work stress 
can impact the decision maker’s response to individual settings. In this narrower domain, we 
found four key factors that led to stressful decision situations. First, perceptions of high gain or 
loss in the decision can result in increased stress while taking that decision (Frisch and Clemen, 
1994). When combined with the riskiness of outcome (a probability measure), high gain/loss can 
enhance the perception of stress.  Third, when the decision environment is complex and highly 
unstructured, individuals can feel increased stress (Johnston, Driskell and Salas, 1997; Hollnagel, 
1987, 1993) since there are fewer past experiences to revert to. Finally, as there is increased 
organizational/internal pressure to achieve success from this decision (Kirby and Davis, 1998), 
individuals may encounter greater perceptions of stress. Although on some scale, most semi-
structured decisions would qualify as stressful decisions, we do emphasize that the intensity of 
these conditions will be higher in order to create stress (Keinan, 1987). 
 Under conditions described above, the decision-maker will undergo several negative 
psychological experiences that can impact decision quality. These perceptions of negative 
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experiences have been termed more broadly as stress. In current literature, stress has been 
measured as perceptions of increased time pressure (Smith, Arnold and Sutton, 1997; Arnold et 
al., 1998; Sutton et al., 1998; Arnold et al., 2000), perceptions of increased information overload 
(Smith et al., 1997; Marsden et al., 2002),  increased perceived dynamism of the decision 
situation, and  increased uncertainty in the decision environment(Field et al., 2006). 
A common trigger for stress is perception of increased time pressure. Although this 
perception can positively impact the focus required for task completion (Karau and Kelly, 1992), 
it is most often associated with reduced decision quality (Hwang and Lin, 1999; Kelly and 
McGrath, 1985; Karau and Kelly, 1992; Stokes and Raby, 1989).  
Stress measured as information overload is also found to be detrimental to decision 
quality (Smith et al. (1997), Marsden et al. (2002), Hahn et al. (1992). Information overload is 
exhibited when the decision maker is receiving more information than he/she can process for 
effective decision making.  Often this decline in decision quality is evidenced by inconsistent 
decision-making, disagreement with composite judgment, and lower consensus (Chewning and 
Harrel, 1990).  Lamb (1991) indicates that information processing capability is limited in 
humans and animals and when the level of information exceeds that capacity selective attention 
is used to process some information at the expense of other information. Vugdelija and Aguirre 
(2004) point out that information overload has a paralyzing effect in crisis situations, and it 
becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish vital information from secondary information.  
Other studies such as those by Schultze and Vandenbosch (1998), Chewning and Harrel (1990), 
and Kim (1998) have also examined the impact of information overload on decision quality, 
though not necessarily under conditions of stress. 
Stressful decision situations increase in intensity as the element of dynamism, such as 
constantly changing criteria or environment for the decision, is introduced. The decision 
environment becomes particularly intense when the decision maker has to make rapid, 
independent decisions under changing conditions such as those associated with threat assessment 
(Phillips-Wren and Forgionne, 2002).  In Kersthot(1994), subjects were required to monitor an 
athlete running a race and determine if the athlete needed treatment to restore her fitness level. 
Subjects tended to use a judgmental approach even though an action-oriented strategy would 
have given the best return. They waited longer to intervene when the probability of false alarms 
increased, but maintained the same intervention level across time pressure conditions.  Waiting 
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longer to take action under conditions of uncertainty has been called ‘action-postponement’ and 
explained as thinking that a decision maker can postpone action until after nature moves 
(Pomerol, 2001).  Executive decisions are inherently dynamic since decision makers need more 
than minimal information, layered advice, fast conflict resolution, and integration between 
decisions and tactical plans to make rapid decisions (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Uncertainty, the lack of complete knowledge about a situation, is known to negatively 
impact a decision maker’s ability to process data and information in a decision situation (Simon 
1980, Nutt, 1990; Landsbergen et al., 1997). It creates fear and/or indecisiveness (Covey, Merrill 
and Merrill, 1994) and causes bias that interferes with rational decision making (Hey, 1993). 
Mahan et al. (1999) suggested that when faced with irreducible levels of uncertainty, decision 
makers often use expert judgment, and that decision support can drive the decision maker toward 
a particular type of cognition. Field et al. (2006) found that uncertainty reduction strategies were 
associated with improved performance.  Hey, Loloto and Maffioletti (2008) found that subjects 
simplify in uncertain situations instead of using more sophisticated decision rules.   
      Business and emergency decisions share similar preconditions, although at varying 
levels. We suggest that stressful managerial decision environments require at least one of four 
pre-conditions: (1) a situation of high/gain or loss; (2) a risky outcome; (3) a complex decision 
environment; and, (4) organizational pressure to minimize the negatives of a decision. These 
preconditions then result in  a manifestation of stress, often represented as (1) time pressure; (2) 
information overload; (3) uncertainty of decision parameters; and/or (4) perception of dynamic 
decision environment.   
 
2.3 Decision Support for Decision Making 
Several studies have provided evidence toward the positive role of DSS on improved 
decision quality.  For instance, Haubl and Trifts (2000) found that online buyers make more 
efficient and better quality decisions when interactive decision aids are provided to them in early 
phases of their decision process. Benbasat, Dexter and Todd (1986) investigated the influence of 
different information representations, color, and information presentation on user perceptions 
and decision performance under varying time constraints. Color led to improvements in decision 
making under time pressure.  Zeleznikow and Nolan (2001) found that soft computing methods 
could be integrated with statistical methods, reasoning from imprecise data, and knowledge 
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discovery from databases to provide effective decision support in uncertain environments. 
Vugdelija and Aguirre (2004) developed an expert system for a power plant to analyze incoming 
information in real-time and verbally announce recommendations for operation.  Such organized 
information feeds resulted in quick response time, identification of relevant information, 
emotionless reasoning, enhanced knowledge, and expert advice. Similarly, Lee (2004) proposed 
a multi-agent system to deal with information overload in electronic commerce and Turetken and 
Sharda (2004) utilized fisheye-based clustering and visualization to mitigate adverse effects of 
information overload from Web searches. Recently, Aminilari and Pakath (2005) examined the 
effectiveness of written text and images on decision makers under time pressured financial 
situations. Image users earned more in this simulation but utilized less accurate search strategies 
as compared to text users.Multimedia (Metha, Webb and Bitter1995), volumetric displays using 
laser technologies to view 3D images (Wild and Griggs, 1998), and decision-centered screen 
displays (Thordsen, 1998) have all been proposed as improved decision support solutions.  
Despite these initiatives, the use of decision aids has largely focused on system design 
and human-computer interaction issues. Furthermore, results on the beneficial use of decision 
technologies have been equivocal. Other studies we encountered, such as that by Akbari and 
Menhaj (2000), focused largely on design of decision aids and overlooked performance 
degrading issues such as stress and workload.  Furthermore, where decision aids were 
implemented, few studies adequately reported their impact on psychological experiences such as 
time pressure and information overload (Xia and Rao, 1999; Negnevitsky, 1996). This 
equivocality is manifested in our limited understanding of how decision making is impacted by 
psychological stress and the mitigating effect of decision aids (Kontogiannis, 1996).  
 
 
3.0 AN INTEGRATED MODEL OF DECISION MAKING UNDER STRESS 
Discussion in the previous section highlights the need to assimilate the disjointed but 
potentially complementary pieces of research in DMUS support. In our proposed model, we aim 
to integrate the two parts of previous research on DMUS – pre-conditions to stress, i.e. the stress 
creators, and perceptions of stress i.e. the psychological manifestation of stress. Figure 1 presents 
this integrative framework. The model presents factors that both create a stressful decision 
situation and those that are experienced once the decision maker is involved in a stressful 
situation.  
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The framework further proposes the intervening role of DSS on perceptions of stress. 
Specifically, the use of DSS can potentially mitigate the negative psychological experiences 
associated with stress and thereby improve decision quality. On the other hand, for certain 
psychological factors, DSS may have the opposite effect – that of worsening the perception of 
the stressor. The DMUS Framework in Figure 1 further suggests that DSS will have little effect 
in mitigating pre-conditions to stress since these are defined by organizational and decision 
environment. Consistent with all existing literature, any mitigation of psychological perceptions 
will improve decision quality. In contrast, if the DSS has deleterious effects on psychological 
perceptions of the decision maker, decision quality will be appropriately harmed.   
 
 
 
Figure 1. The DMUS Framework - Proposed model to characterize stressful decision situations, 
decision quality, and the mitigating role of decision support systems. 
 
The framework makes several suggestions, all of which can benefit from further research: 
 
Proposition 1(a): Individuals who experience high gain or loss situations will 
perceive greater stress manifested as dynamism and uncertainty as compared to 
individuals who do not perceive such a risk. 
 
Proposition 1(b): Individuals who perceive high gain or loss situations and use 
DSS for decision making will experience lower levels of dynamism and 
uncertainty as compared to individuals who do not use such a decision aid. 
 
Decision 
Quality 
Decision 
Support 
System 
Risk 
High Gain / 
Loss 
Organi-
zational 
Pressure 
Complexity 
Pre-conditions 
to stress 
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Time 
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Proposition 2(a): Individuals who perceive high risk in their decision 
environment will perceive greater stress manifested as dynamism and uncertainty 
as compared to individuals who do not perceive such a risk. 
 
Proposition 2(b): Individuals who perceive high risk situations and use DSS for 
decision making will perceive lower levels of dynamism and uncertainty as 
compared to individuals who do not use such a decision aid. 
 
Proposition 3(a): Individuals who perceive complexity in their decision 
environment will perceive greater stress manifested as time pressure, information 
overload, dynamism, and uncertainty as compared to individuals who do not 
perceive such a risk. 
 
Proposition 3(b): Individuals who percieve complexity in their decision 
environment and use DSS for decision making will experience lower levels of 
time pressure, information overload, dynamism, and uncertainty as compared to 
individuals who do not use such a decision aid. 
 
Proposition 4(a): Individuals who perceive organizational pressure in their 
decision environment will perceive greater stress manifested as time pressure and 
dynamism as compared to individuals who do not perceive such a risk. 
 
Proposition 4(b): Individuals who perceive organizational pressure in their 
decision environment and use DSS for decision making will experience lower 
levels of time pressure and dynamism as compared to individuals who do not use 
such a decision aid. 
We examine some of these propositions in this paper. 
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4.0 EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 
      To conduct a preliminary test of our model we executed a research study with 123 
undergraduate business students enrolled in a business information systems course.  Student 
subjects have been widely used to study decision making and risk-taking situations (Valacich et 
al., 2009).  Valacich et al. (2009) pointed out that there are numerous studies comparing student 
decision making with managers in real organizations indicating that “there are few differences in 
the costs, erraticism, or patterns of biases in decisions made by these two groups” (p. 905).  In 
addition, student subjects are often preferable to practicing managers when studying decision 
making due to organizational influences that are difficult to control. 
 The subjects in the study were divided into low and high stress groups based on the 
treatment that was administered to them. The pre-conditions of stress proposed in the DMUS 
framework were used to create conditions of high and low stress. A DSS was made available to 
both the high and low stress groups. The decision task was to invest $50,000 in a portfolio of 
stocks for a company with the intent of maximizing return.  Motivating factors were incentives 
of $10 gift certificates for food, at least one in each class, and a $100 grand prize for the overall 
best decision. 
 Demographics of the subject group were fairly homogeneous.  All subjects were enrolled 
in a university in the same introductory business course with a common syllabus across all 
sections, were in the 19-20 year old age group, had been admitted based on similar 
characteristics such as grades and high SAT scores, and were in class sizes of about 25 students 
each with four instructors with equivalent educations and experience. Four class sections were 
taught by two different instructors so that each instructor had two different treatment scenarios, 
one under stress and one not under stress.  All subjects used a DSS as shown in Figure 2.  
Participation was voluntary, and the experiment was held during class in a controlled computer 
lab.  
 
4.1 The Decision Task and Stress Conditions 
 Subjects were given the scenario of a first job in which they have $50,000 to invest in a 
portfolio of stocks for their company. The decision problem was to choose a stock portfolio for 
investing their funds to optimize value while minimizing risk.  The portfolio consisted of 37 
stocks divided into sectors as shown in Appendix 1 and drawn from actual historical data. 
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Subjects were told to invest at least $10,000 in each of 3 different areas such as technology, 
energy, etc.  They did not have to invest all of the money and any remainder was left as cash 
with no interest.  Data were provided for the share price for each of the last 4 quarters, the 
current share price (the purchase price), and the historical return rate.  Subjects were informed 
that: 
Expected Return = (Avg. share price over 5 data points) * (# of shares 
purchased) * (historic annual rate of return)  
Instructions were presented in writing and verbally in the same manner in each class. Subjects 
were provided opportunities through a follow-up Q&A session to obtain clarification on the task.       
 Risk was described as the variability of the share price, that is, the more variable the 
stock price has been, and the more money put into it, the more risky the portfolio.  On the other 
hand, more risk usually translates into higher potential earnings.  The decision question was 
posed as: How should you invest up to $50,000 in a stock portfolio (3 different areas, at least 
$10,000 per stock, do not have to invest all your money) so that you maximize your portfolio 
value while minimizing your risk? Maule and Svenson (1993) define risky decisions as those 
“characterized by coupling between alternatives and outcomes that are probabilistic and 
therefore cannot be predicted with certainty” (p. 9), and this scenario is consistent with their 
definition.  
 Following our proposed model in Figure 1, preconditions to stress were introduced.  
High gain/loss was simulated using the $50,000 investment amount with potentially high return 
or high loss.  Risk was directly calculated as described later in section 4.2 and stocks with high 
variability were included.  Complexity was captured through the large number of stocks, 
multiple constraints on investing, necessity of balancing return and risk, and lack of experience 
on the part of the users. Organizational pressure was introduced by posting class competition 
scores and giving one grand prize to the entire winning class.  Individual scores were also posted 
with the permission of each person to increase stress and all results were announced publicly as 
was known ahead of time.  
 The treatment conditions varied stress in one of two experimental conditions.  The 
psychological manifestations of stress were time pressure, uncertainty, information overload, and 
dynamism.  Time was specifically manipulated.  The large number of choices and complexity of 
the decision provided an environment where we expected subjects to experience the other three 
                             Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/9-55
 12 
stressors.  In the low stress conditions subjects were given unlimited time to make their 
decisions, and in the high stress conditions subjects were given 10 minutes.  The variability in 
the stock prices and large amount of information presented many possibilities, and subjects were 
not able to investigate all scenarios within the allocated 10 minutes. 
 A DSS must be matched to the decision problem and to the decision maker (Howard, 
1988).  The DSS was written specifically for the experiment and consisted of an interface for 
investment, drill-down into the stock past performance with tables and graphs, user input for 
various portfolio choices, and output of the expected return and the associated risk.  The 
interface is shown in Figure 2.  There is large variability possible with the design of the DSS, and 
in order to remove the DSS as a variable in the study, we chose to vary stressors in the 
experiment. 
 
Figure 2. Screen print of the interface for the DSS. 
 
4.2  The Decision Environment - Portfolio Risk, Return, and Optimization 
 Investors seek to maximize return on investments while maintaining an acceptable level 
of risk.  Risk and return are related, with higher return usually associated with higher risk.  A 
portion of the risk associated with an individual stock can be diversified away by balancing it 
with less risky stocks for a given level of investment. The Expected Return on a portfolio was 
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computed as the weighted average of the expected returns on the stocks that make up the 
portfolio, with the weights reflecting the proportion of funds invested in each stock (Ballestero 
and Pla-Santamaria, 2004).  That is, for n stocks, i = 1 to n, 
 
                                           E[Rp] = ∑ wi E[Ri] 
where E[Rp] is the expected return on the portfolio, n is the number of stocks in the portfolio, wi 
is the proportion of funds invested in stock i, and E[Ri] is the expected return on stock i.   
 The variance (or standard deviation) of a portfolio reflects the variance (or standard 
deviation) of the stocks that make up the portfolio as well as how they vary together, measured 
as the covariance or correlation coefficient.  Risk was calculated as the weighted average of the 
variances of individual stocks, with the weight based on the amount of funds invested in each 
stock in the portfolio.  That is, for n stocks, i = 1 to n, 
 
                                           Risk = ∑ wi s 
 
where E[Rp] is the expected return on the portfolio, n is the number of stocks in the portfolio, wi 
is the proportion of funds invested in stock i, and E[Ri] is the expected return on stock i.   
 An optimal portfolio can be defined in one of two equivalent ways:  
(1) For any level of volatility (or risk), select the portfolio that has the highest return. 
(2) For any expected return, select the portfolio with the lowest volatility (or risk).   
Either definition can be satisfied with a portfolio from the stock options called the efficient 
frontier with the set of portfolios obtained from one definition the same as those from the other 
definition.  The efficient frontier for our stock options is shown in Figure 3. 
 The graph has the normal bullet nose shape, with the region in the center between the 
branches being other portfolios that can be formed from the stock options.  The top branch or 
positively sloped portion of the graph is the efficient frontier.  We defined the optimal portfolio 
under the constraints in our experiment as the point at the top of the efficient frontier; that is, it is 
the point at which we have maximum return for minimum risk. 
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Figure 3.  Efficient Frontier for portfolios in experiment. 
 
 
4.3 Experimental Result 
 Subjects in each of the two experimental conditions reported portfolio selections under 
our constraints and experimental conditions.  A review of portfolio selection results (HSDSS=59, 
LSDSS=64) resulted in the elimination of data from subjects who did not adhere to the 
guidelines, i.e. invest at least $10,000 in each of 3 different areas any remainder left as cash with 
no interest.  This resulted in a final sample of n=53 for HSDSS cases and n=55 for LSDSS cases 
for portfolio results.  The mean return, standard deviation, and mean risk are reported in Table 1.   
Table 1. Experimental Return and Risk of Portfolio Compared to Treatment Condition 
 
 
 
Number 
Subjects (n) 
Mean  
Return 
Std. Dev. 
Return 
Mean  
Risk 
(Variance) 
Std. Dev. of 
Risk 
HSDSS 53 $62258.39 $13374.95 3.720 8.943 
LSDSS 55 $73918.71 $17409.49 2.201 2.759 
 
     Normality of the samples was checked using the Anderson-Darling goodness-of-fit test 
statistic at a significance level of 0.05.  This indicates whether a data sample comes from a 
population with a specific distribution.  It makes use of the specific distribution in calculating 
critical values.  Anderson-Darling is a one-sided test wherein the hypothesis that the distribution 
is a particular form is rejected at the chosen significance level if the test statistic is greater than 
the critical value for the normal distribution.  The adjusted Anderson-Darling statistic is 
multiplied by a constant that depends on the sample size (Trujillo-Ortiz, 2007).  The results of 
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the Anderson-Darling test is shown in Table 2.  As can be seen, none of the distributions are 
normal, and therefore we could not use statistical tests assuming normality. 
Table 2.  Results of the Anderson-Darling test for the samples at alpha=0.050. 
  
 
Sample size 
 
Anderson-
Darling 
statistic 
 
Anderson-
Darling 
adjusted 
statistic 
Probability 
associated to 
the Anderson-
Darling 
statistic 
 
 
Distribution 
HSDSS 53 3.4465 3.4980 0.0000 Not normal 
LSDSS 55 2.9846 3.0275 0.0000 Not normal 
 
     Next, we tested the hypothesis of equal medians for the two independent unequal-sized 
samples using the Wilcoxon rank sum test with a significance level of 0.05.  The test is used 
when populations are not normal in place of the two sample t-test.  The test consists of 
combining the samples into one sample, sorting the result, assigning ranks to the sorted values, 
and then finding the sum of the ranks.  If the two populations have the same distribution then the 
sum of the ranks in each sample should be close to the same value.  Comparing the LSDSS case 
with the HSDSS case, the Wilcoxon rank sum test yields p=2.8111e-004, and we reject the null 
hypothesis that the medians are equal.  We are 95% confident that the two samples are drawn 
from different populations.   
 
4.4 Psychological Responses 
At the participant level, the outcome of a stressful situation can be driven by several 
personality and environmental factors. Some that particularly concerned us were individual 
ability to handle stress, prior experience in both task and use of technology for the task, and 
differential perceptions of high gain or loss. Choosing subjects with similar backgrounds and 
experiences minimized this difference in such experiences and abilities. Where an occasional 
subject does demonstrate high experience in these areas, we expect that a statistically acceptable 
sample size would mitigate the effects of such confounding factors. Possibly measures such as 
those suggested by Pratt (1964) and inventories such as Coping Resources Inventory can be used 
to measure risk aversion in future studies. 
      Each subject who participated in the experiment completed a questionnaire with a Likert 
scale of 1 to 5 measuring their perception of time pressure, uncertainty, information overload and 
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dynamism.  The specific statements posed to the subjects, means of the responses, and standard 
deviations are shown in Table 3.  The number of subjects in the sample reflect all those that 
participated in the study, and the sample sizes are larger than those shown in Table 1 since 
several portfolio results were eliminated as discussed previously.  
 
Table 3.  Reported psychological experiences in two experimental conditions. 
 
HSDSS LSDSS   
n=59   n=64   
Standard Standard   
Mean Deviation Mean deviation 
  
 
Time Pressure: The time assigned to this task was sufficient. 
 2.9153 1.1932 4.0161 1.1234 
 
Uncertainty: It was clear what choice was best for me. 
 2.5254 1.0725 2.8413 1.0657 
 
Information Overload: I felt overwhelmed with the amount of information provided to me for 
this task. 
 2.1186 0.8727 1.7937 0.7220 
 
Dynamism: I did not have to change my decisions again and again. 
 2.4237 0.9685 2.3651 1.0519 
 
The Wilcoxon rank sum test for hypothesis of equal medians for two independent unequal-sized 
samples at significance level of 0.05 was used to determine if the sample means are significantly 
different.  The results are shown in Table 4.  We reject the null hypothesis that the medians of 
the two groups are equal for time pressure and information overload.  We do not reject the null 
hypothesis for uncertainty and dynamism.   
 
Table 4: Wilcoxon Test for Hypothesis of Equal Medians for Reported Psychological 
Experiences 
 Time 
Pressure 
Uncertainty Information 
Overload 
Dynamism 
HSDSS 
compared to 
LSDSS 
p=0.000 
Reject 
p=0.1203 
Do not reject 
p=0.0269 
Reject 
p=0.5709 
Do not reject 
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4.5 Discussion of Results 
 
     In terms of performance, the results are consistent with the literature.  The Yerkes-Dodson 
curve suggests that stress will decrease performance after some point, all else being equal, and 
this effect is seen our experiment.  We reject the null hypothesis of equal means in terms of 
performance for the two groups.  Since the LSDSS mean return is $73,918.71 with mean risk = 
2.20 and the HSDSS mean return is $62,258.39 with mean risk = 3.720, we conclude that 
subjects made better decisions under low stress conditions compared to high stress. The low 
stress group has both a higher mean return and a lower risk that the higher stress group. 
    The psychological responses of the two groups are different for some variables.  Since time 
was specifically manipulated, we expected the high stress group to recognize time pressure, and 
they did.  The HSDSS group also reported a difference in their perception of information 
overload compared to the LSDSS group, and this result was not expected since the DSS was 
hypothesized to mitigate this response.  The results indicate that there is no difference in the 
reported psychological experiences under the two experimental conditions in terms of 
uncertainty and dynamism. We suggest that this is support for the hypothesis that the DSS 
mitigated the effect of stress in terms of these two variables.   
 
5.0 IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH 
  The results from our preliminary application of the DMUS framework indicate potential 
for future research in this domain. First, this model may be further enhanced by examining other 
pre-conditions and decision stressors. More specifically, we have not examined or attempted to 
distinguish various features of the DSS to determine what aspect of the DSS has greater impact 
on the psychological stressors. Researchers engaged in DSS design research may benefit from 
keeping the pre-conditions and psychological factors constant while examining effectiveness of 
specific DSS characteristics such as color and information presentation across experimental 
groups.  
Secondly, the evidence regarding effectiveness of DSS on decision quality has been 
somewhat contradictory. For instance, Joslyn and Hunt (1998) focused on individual differences 
of the decision maker in time-pressured situations and found that some people handle time 
pressure better than others.  This ability may result in better decision-making under stressful 
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situations. As a result, the effectiveness of DSS may or may not be relevant in this case.   Dora et 
al. (2001) evaluated a decision support system for treatment of severe head injury patients by 
comparing physician expert opinions with results generated by the decision support system.  The 
study concluded that the tool was not accurate enough to support complex decisions in high-
stress environments. Lerch and Harter (2001) found that providing certain types of cognitive 
support for real-time dynamic decision making can degrade performance and designing systems 
for such tasks is challenging. This contradictory evidence leads to the question – is there a 
threshold beyond which DSS begin to lose their effectiveness in mitigating psychological 
experiences? Yerkes and Dodson (1908) have proposed that there is an "inverted U" shaped 
relationship between the levels of arousal or stress and the efficiency of memory (see Fig 4.). A 
certain amount of arousal can be a motivator toward change (with change in this discussion 
being learning). Too much or too little change will certainly work against the learner. Too little 
arousal has an inert effect on the learner while too much has a hyperactive affect. Furthermore, 
for each task optimal levels of arousal have to be discovered. This optimal level is (a) lower for 
more difficult or intellectually (cognitive) tasks since learners need to concentrate on the 
material, and (b) higher for tasks requiring endurance and persistence since learners need more 
motivation. Subsequent research has confirmed that the correlation suggested by Yerkes and 
Dodson exists (Broadhurst, 1959; Telegdy and Cohen 1971; Anderson, 1994; Dickman, 2002) 
and many psychological and physiological factors have been developed to explain the 
phenomenon. The Yerkes-Dodson Law can be extended to the use of DSS for stressful decision 
making. If stimulation beyond an optimal level serves to degrade performance, how does the use 
of DSS for supporting DMUS change the psychological experiences and stress at which a 
decision maker operates?  Based on this research, we make the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 5: DSS will mitigate psychological effects of stress to a point beyond 
which its effectiveness in such mitigation and, subsequently, decision quality will 
decline.  
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Figure 4: The Inverted ‘U’ Curve representing Yerkes-Dodson Law.  
Adapted from Diamond (2005). 
 
 Finally, the above argument has interesting implications for both researchers who study 
DSS design and those who study related decision making. For DSS designers, determining DSS 
features that extend the point of decreasing returns will be a productive investment of time and 
research efforts. For organizational behaviorists and psychologists, understanding and leveraging 
individual factors that can result in better utilization of these DSS features will be worthwhile 
direction to enhance our understanding of human decision making and information processing 
abilities.  
 
6.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 While prior research initiatives have provided deep understanding of particular aspects of 
decision support technology and have explored specific benefits to decision making under time 
pressure, we propose a broader framework that focuses on multiple gains from decision aids: 
reduction of negative psychological experiences of time pressure, information overload, 
uncertainty, and dynamism as well as improving decision quality.  In this paper we explored the 
effect of stress on decision making with a DSS.  We hypothesized that using a DSS would 
mitigate the reported psychological experiences under stress.  Our experimental data only 
partially support the model.  We found support for mitigation of uncertainly and dynamism as 
reported psychological experiences in high and low stress conditions with a DSS. 
  The contributions of this paper to the literature are: 
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(1) providing a thorough review and synthesis of the literature on decision making under 
stress as related to decision support systems; 
(2) proposing an integrated model based on the literature that separates preconditions to 
stress from psychological perceptions of stress; 
(3) separating variables so that the potential mitigating role of decision support systems in 
stressful decision making can be studied; 
(4) characterizing the role of decision support systems in improving decision quality under 
stress; 
(5) providing experimental data to demonstrate that decision support systems can mitigate 
some reported psychological experiences under stress.      
 
Further research is needed to validate or refute the hypotheses and results of this study.  Our data 
are limited, and the stressful decision making is better studied in real environments.  Based on 
our study, however, we suggest that decision support systems could be specifically designed to 
mitigate the negative effects of stress on human decision making in terms of the variables we 
have identified, and that this is a fruitful area of future research. 
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APPENDIX 1  Stock choices for the portfolio. 
  
  Company Name Category 
1 Intel Tech 
2 Dell Tech 
3 MSFT Tech 
4 Toshiba Tech 
5 Compaq Tech 
6 Gas Inc. Energy 
7 BP Energy 
8 Nuclear Inc Energy 
9 Exxon Energy 
10 Mobile Energy 
11 Hydro Inc. Energy 
12 Citgo Energy 
13 Chevron Energy 
14 Ford Auto 
15 Saturn Auto 
16 Toyota Auto 
17 Honda Auto 
18 Isuzu Auto 
19 Mercedes Auto 
20 Aflac Insurance 
21 Nationwide Insurance 
22 Verizon Communication 
23 Tmobile Communication 
24 ATT Communication 
25 Cingular Communication 
26 MCI Communication 
27 GRU Utilities 
28 FLPowerLt Utilities 
29 Banana Rep Retail 
30 Ann Taylor Retail 
31 Sears Retail 
32 Gap Retail 
33 Old Navy Retail 
34 Ross Retail 
35 Burdines Retail 
36 JC Penny Retail 
37 Dillards Retail 
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